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COMMENTARIES
LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY
KENT GREENAWALT*
In modern Western political and legal thought, the subject of
legal enforcement of morality is narrower than the literal coverage of
those terms. That is because much legal enforcement of morality is
uncontroversial and rarely discussed. Disagreement arises only when
the law enforces aspects of morality that do not involve protecting
others from fairly direct harms. More precisely, people raise questions about legal requirements (1) to perform acts that benefit others,
(2) to refrain from acts that cause indirect harms to others, (3) to
refrain from acts that cause harm to themselves, (4) to refrain from
acts that offend others, and (5) to refrain from acts that others believe
are immoral. Answers to some of these questions may be affected by
whether the relevant moral judgments are essentially religious. Subsidiary questions concern the appropriateness of taxes adopted to discourage behavior the government should not forbid outright and the
appropriateness of prohibitions on others profiting from such behavior (as when someone lives off the earnings of prostitutes).
Since it is rare that one argument for restricting behavior will
stand by itself, with no other arguments supporting restriction, a conclusion about a single theoretical issue will not usually yield a decisive
answer as to whether any particular behavior should remain free.
However, a conclusion that some argument for restraint is unwarranted can significantly affect the overall power of the totality of arguments. For example, if someone concludes that the claimed
immorality of homosexual behavior is not a proper basis on which to
forbid it, this will substantially affect the overall strength of reasons in
favor of prohibition.
A final subtlety concerns two perspectives from which to consider
the subject of the legal enforcement of morality. One perspective is
* This essay is a slightly revised version of one prepared for the Blackwell Companion
to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory.
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that of legislative philosophy: "Should the legislature enforce morality
by law?" The second perspective is that of a court in a constitutional
regime: "Should enforcement of morality count as a legitimate basis
for legislation that is challenged as invalid?" One might think that legislatures should not rely upon certain reasons, but that courts should
accept them as adequate if legislatures do rely upon them. In addition, a reason might be acceptable for most legislation, but not, say,
for legislation that infringes on liberty of expression. Finally, a reason
might be acceptable as a matter of general philosophy of government,
but not in a constitutional regime that mandates the separation of
church and state.
This Article explains these major questions in turn, but first addresses the self-evident point that legal enforcement of morality is usually appropriate.
I.

LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORAL

NoRMs

AGAINST CAUSING HARM

Any comprehensive morality includes restraints against harming
other people. Murder, assault, theft, and fraud are immoral. In any
society sufficiently developed to have a law distinguishable from its
social morality, this law will forbid murder, assault, theft, and some
forms of fraud. As H.LA. Hart pointed out, law and social morality
will constrain much of the same behavior.' This does not mean, of
course, that the law will enforce every aspect of morality that concerns
preventing harm to others. Law is a crude instrument, requiring findings of uncertain facts, with rules backed by a limited arsenal of coercive sanctions. Many immoral acts that hurt others are unregulated by
the law. Nevertheless, no one doubts that, in principle, protecting
others from harm is an appropriate task for legal rules. Exactly what
protection these rules should extend is a matter of prudential judgment or some kind of balancing of morally relevant factors. These
plain truths may obscure some complexities that one must consider
when asking if legal rules should prohibit acts on other grounds.
The idea of harm to someone else must be clarified and developed. If every unpleasant feeling or negative thought qualified as a
harm, an act might be prohibited because it made some people envious or disturbed them. With such an expansive notion of harm, prevention of harm to others would justify enforcement of all aspects of
morality. 2 Inquiries into whether legal rules should prevent people
from harming themselves (or enforce morality as such) would then
1

H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 188-95 (1961).
2 However, the weight of reasons in favor of a legal rule would still be influenced by a

focus on the gravity of such harm.
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have far less practical significance. In his nuanced and exhaustive
treatment of this subject, Joel Feinberg suggests that, for a principle of
preventing harms to others, the "harms" that warrant consideration are
"setbacks to interests" that are, in some way, wrong.3 Thus, because
no wrong has occurred when an actress is fairly chosen for an important role, that choice does not harm an envious rival who loses the
opportunity to earn $1,000,000. Exactly what qualify as harms to
others is of central importance when examining the bases for contested legal regulations.
One significant point is that the prevention of harm to others
includes prevention of harm that is most directly inflicted on people
as a collective. Thus, the "harm principle" generates no difficulty for
a law against spying on the government. What harms qualify as collective harms, however, is an issue to which it is necessary to return.
Two related questions regarding harm to others affect much of
the rest of this essay. Their explication here will clarify what follows:
(1) Is it possible to make decisions about legal regulation without any
moral judgment whatsoever? (2) if moral judgment is necessary in
deciding what qualifies as relevant harm, does it follow that general
enforcement of morality is appropriate?
In answer to the first question, a distinction between wrongful
and nonwrongful harms does involve moral judgment, for example,
the judgment that suffering envy at the deserved success of others is
not a relevant harm. Is this sort of judgment avoidable? It is possible
to imagine a legal system with regulations based on an assessment of
negative consequences that considers only overall individual preferences, happiness, or ability to pay, relying on no (other) moral judgments ("no other," because deciding that only preferences, happiness,
or ability to pay should be considered is, itself, a moraljudgment). If
someone conceives the grounds for legal regulation as restricted in
this way, would the grounds for legal regulation seem more limited
than the grounds for moral judgments in general? This depends.
"Average happiness utilitarians" base all moral judgments on actual
and prospective happiness. It would be misleading, however, to describe their position as one in which legal regulation is determined
without moral judgment, because they would use the same kinds of
assessments to make all correct moral judgments as they use to determine appropriate legal restrictions. Suppose, by contrast, someone
thinks that sound morality includes many grounds for judgment, but
that almost all of these grounds are irrelevant for legal regulation.
3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE

(1984).

MORAL

LIMIaS OF THE CIMmINAL LAw. HARM TO OTHERS

31-104
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This position might be phrased as one in which legal regulation can
be determined without moral judgment. But it is hard to understand
how someone could defend the substance of this position. Why
should moral distinctions that govern the nonlegal evaluation of acts
become irrelevant for evaluating legal rules? The answer is that they
should not. Thus, the principles guiding legal regulation must include moral judgments.
If moral judgment affects determinations of harm, it does not
necessarily follow that legal rules appropriately enforce morality in
general. It may be that for reasons of moral and political philosophy,
harm to others (determined partly by moral judgment) should be an
appropriate basis for legal regulation, whereas moral evils that do not
involve harm to others should remain free of legal regulation. The
next sections examine whether the law should enforce morality in various senses.
II.

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS TO PERFORM

AcTs

THAT BENEFIT OTHERS

Should people have a legal duty to rescue others? In most states
of the United States and in many other countries, people do not have
such a duty. A person who walks by a shallow pool in which a baby is
drowning, fully aware that saving the baby would cause no more harm
than wet feet, can keep on walking without criminal or civil consequence. On occasion, people have defended this legal principle on
the ground that the law should not enforce morality. This claim is
either confused or unpersuasive.
It helps, initially, to narrow the real basis of contention. People
often suppose that omissions to act have a different moral status from
actions. If A breaks B's arm, A does something worse, morally, than if
A fails to prevent Cfrom breaking B's arm. Although an extreme utilitarian might deny the moral significance of a distinction between action and omission, I assume it in what follows. Everyone agrees that
preventing easily-avoidable, serious harms is morally preferableto letting
them occur, and most acknowledge that people have a moral duty to
rescue the drowning baby.
The law draws no universal line between action and omission.
People who have a special responsibility to care for others cannot
stand by and let those for whom they are responsible suffer avoidable
injury. A parent or hired nurse who, with full awareness of what is
happening, lets the baby drown is guilty of murder or manslaughter.
Indeed, people perform a wide range of roles that include responsibilities to care for others. Further, people have general duties to act for
the benefit of the public. They have a legal duty to testify, even if they

KENT GREENAWALT

[Vol. 85

would rather not; they must pay taxes; and they must submit to jury
service. Few doubt that the law properly requires some people to act
to avoid harm and requires nearly all people to contribute to the common welfare.
Since anyone who is not an anarchist is likely to acknowledge that
governments rightly impose on people some positive duties to act, any
principled controversy appears to be over whether the law should require strangers to assist individuals in need. Some of the arguments
against such liability are: (1) determining the state of mind of someone who could rescue, but did not, is usually very difficult; (2) people
in a position to rescue (say on a beach, or at home with their telephones as a rape happens outside) frequently believe someone else
may do it; (3) a duty to help others in need is too vague; and (4) such
a duty infringes inappropriately on the autonomy of citizens to pursue
their own projects.
From a consequentialist perspective, these problems are matters
of degree. A legal duty requiring people to prevent death or severe
injury to another when they are fortuitously in the position to do so at
no risk and at slight cost to themselves is a minimal infringement on
individuals' pursuit of their own projects. 4 Limiting the duty to persons who find themselves in situations in which others are not equally
able to help, avoids the complexity concerning many available potential rescuers. If determining the state of mind of someone who fails to
assist is deemed too difficult, a failure to rescue can be treated as criminal or civil negligence. Circumscribing the legal duty to assist in this
manner largely surmounts the vagueness problem. One might reasonably conclude that such a legal duty would cover so few circumstances that it would not be worth imposing-and that it might even
detract from nobler motivations to help. However, there can be no
principled consequentialist objection to the propriety of such a duty.
Does an examination from a deontological perspective (based on
moral rights and justice) yield a different conclusion? I assume that a
moral duty to rescue exists (if one assumes that rescue is only a question of moral desirability, not of moral duty, one still might believe
that a legal duty is appropriate, since, in some domains, the law requires more than is required by independent moral duty). Given that
the law properly imposes legal duties to rescue on those with special
responsibilities and also imposes legal duties on the general public to
satisfy public responsibilities, no basis exists for an absolute principle
against requiring stranger rescue. People imagining that they might
4 The idea of one beingfortuitously in the position to help is needed so that those with
special skills, mainly doctors, are not on constant call to assist strangers in need.
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be in the position of needing rescue or might be able to make a rescue certainly would choose to have such a legal duty (since the adverse consequence of not being rescued is far greater than the
inconvenience of rescuing).5 A duty to rescue is a reasonable responsibility of citizens. People may believe that, on balance, imposing the
duty is unwise, but the duty involves no breach of any defensible deontological principle that law should not enforce morality.
III.

REQUIREMENTS TO REFRAIN FROM

ACTS

THAT CAUSE INDIRECT

HARM TO OTHERS

Before examining claims that self-protection, offense, and perceptions of immorality are themselves inappropriate bases for regulation, it is necessary to look at indirect harms to others. Many acts that
do not cause direct harm may hurt people indirectly. In On Liberty,
the most famous work on the legal enforcement of morality (and on
enforcement of morality by public opinion), John Stuart Mill wrote,
"the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others."6 Mill acknowledged that when people harm themselves it affects others through their sympathy and interests, but he
concluded that only when "a person is led to violate a distinct and
assignable obligation to any other person or persons [is] the case
taken out of the self-regarding class." 7 As an example, Mill asserted
that "no person ought to be punished simply for being drunk; but a
soldier or policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty."8
May indirect harms to others, contrary to Mill, properly be a basis
for legal restriction? Consider three instances of indirect harm: (1)
when an action will certainly cause harm to others; (2) when a likely
future consequence of action is harm to others; (3) when an action is
likely to make someone a burden on society.
If parents with young children commit suicide, they are unable to
provide further material and emotional support for their children.
That is certain. Criminalizing suicide may be pointless, but the harm
to young children is a proper basis for preventing parents from committing suicide, when such prevention would be effective. Whatever
conceptual division between direct and indirect effects makes sense, a
consequence that is certain to follow from an action is one on which
society may base regulation.
5 People might not choose to have a legal duty ifthey believed the moral sense of
others would assure rescue.
6 JOHN STUART Mii, ON Lui RTs 15 (Oxford University Press ed. 1975).
7 Id. at 99-100.
8 Id. at 100.
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Future consequences that are likely, but not certain, pose a more
complex problem. Suppose evidence strongly suggests that if the use
of a particular psychedelic drug became legal, most people who began
to use it would eventually become addicted and would, at that point
(because of cost and physical effects of the drug), be unable to perform family obligations. Further, once people used this drug extensively, their desire to consume it would be more intense than if they
had never or seldom used it. Would this harm "down the road" be a
proper basis for forbidding all use of the drug or all use of the drug by
parents of young children? If a high percentage of parent-users would
eventually neglect their children and no one could determine, in advance, which parents would be the "neglectors," forbidding all use, at
least by parents of young children, would make practical sense. Certainly a consequentialist perspective warrants such a restriction. If one
were to mount a plausible consequentialist argument in favor of an
absolute principle against prohibitions based on such indirect effects,
one would have to contend that governments cannot be trusted to
limit legal restraint to extreme situations in which expected future
harm is serious and pervasive and restraint at the initial stage is much
more effective.
Focusing on a nonconsequential right to liberty might lead someone to believe that people who are capable of controlling themselves
should not be restricted because other people, even a high percentage of users, lack such control and will end up doing harm to their
children. If the percentage of nonaddicted users was slight, the cost
in human misery of recognizing this claimed right would be high; and
an absolute right of this sort would be unattractive. Nonetheless, the
basic idea of some such claim to liberty suggests a counter to any exclusively consequential analysis of the problem. The appeal of the
claim to liberty seems most powerful when the high-risk activity is
thought to reflect some commendable striving of the human spirit, as
with extremely dangerous mountain climbing.
What about actions that are thought to bear an unacceptable risk
that a person will become a burden on society? This is one justification offered for laws that require automobile drivers to wear seat belts
and motorcyclists and bicyclists to wear helmets. From a consequentialist point of view, the value of liberty and the pleasure of riding
unconstrained might somehow be weighed against the likely cost of
injury. The cost appraisal would need to be reasonably comprehensive; if cigarette smoking leads to public medical expenses, does it also
save public money because smokers tend to live shorter lives after retirement? Someone who places a great intrinsic value on liberty may
claim that no public burden is sufficient to justify restriction. If soci-
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ety wants to protect itself, it can demand that people who engage in
dangerous activities buy insurance to cover possible expenses of injury. Since that available lesser restriction will protect the public
purse, across-the-board-prohibition is not warranted, even if it is easier
to administer.
In summary, some arguments for restriction based on likely indirect effects run into claims of autonomy that people will assess as
more or less powerful according to their overall approach to moral
and political philosophy.
IV.

REQUIREMENTS TO REFRAIN FROM SELF-HARMING ACTIONS

Is harm to the actor an appropriate reason for legal prohibition?9
If morality bears on how people should treat themselves, and if the
law should not interfere to prevent self-harms, then this is one respect
in which the law should not enforce morality. Mill put the principle
in favor of nonrestriction boldly. A person's "own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" for society to exercise power
over that person.' 0 With regard to conduct "which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute."' If people followed
Mill's principle (and did not regard indirect effects on others as an
adequate basis on which to regulate), there would probably be no seat
belt and helmet laws, no laws restricting voluntary sexual activities
among adults, no laws against most presently proscribed drugs, no
rules forbidding swimming at unguarded beaches, no legal restraint
of suicide, and far fewer regulations on food, medical drugs, and related matters.
Mill speaks of an absolute right, but the grounds underlying the
right are consequential. He argues that, given differences among individuals, what is good for most people often is not good for everyone,
and that people grow by learning through experience. He argues further that experiments in living are vital for the progress of the human
race, and that the majority cannot be trusted to restrict wisely. When
one considers most sexual activities, these arguments are powerful.
But what of an activity like cigarette smoking? Few mature adults (in
the United States at least) are pleased to be smokers; but most smokers find it difficult to quit. The nearly universal desire for decent
health makes it possible to say confidently that cigarette smoking is
harmful to smokers (or at least unwisely reckless). Thus, unless one's
9 For this question, it is widely assumed that adults voluntarily engaging in behavior
together, such as sexual acts, are not distinguishable in principle from individuals acting by
themselves.
10 MiEL, supra note 6, at 15.

11 Id
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distrust of the majority is extreme, one cannot, on consequentialist
grounds, settle on a principle as absolute as Mill's.
Such an absolute principle is more comfortably defended on the
ground that adults should have autonomy to decide how to live their
lives, making even foolish choices as long as they do not harm others.
The value of autonomy seems most directly opposed to restriction that
is designed to protect actors themselves.
In considering the defensibility of a powerful principle against
any legal "paternalism" that protects people from themselves, it helps
to consider voluntary choice, paternalism that serves the reflective values of the actor, and paternalism that imposes values that the actor
rejects. Restriction of people for their own good is easiest to justify
when voluntary choice is absent. If voluntary choice is present, restriction on behalf of values the actor accepts amounts to a less severe
restriction on autonomy than restriction on behalf of values that the
actor rejects.
The use of seat belts provides an apt starting point for the examination of these issues. For most people, using seat belts in
automobiles is a minor restriction. In addition, few people are indifferent to loss of life or grave physical injury, and use of seat belts
reduces the likelihood of these occurrences. Yet, many people choose
not to use seat belts. One might analyze these facts in the following
way: The chances of having a bad accident on any one occasion of
driving are slight. Some people are not fully aware of the value of
wearing a seat belt in the event of an accident; others fail to act rationally in the face of a very slight risk of injury, and they are disposed not
to imagine that they will actually be in a serious accident. For complex psychological reasons, they do not respond sensibly to the risks
involved. People might view a requirement that they wear seat belts as
forcing them to do what is prudent and reasonable given their own values. One might even argue that a choice made as a result of ignorance
or under conditions when rational assessment is difficult is not really
voluntary. Suffice it to say that the more acts one considers not voluntary, the more one will believe that state restrictions are countering
undesirable choices that are insufficiently voluntary.
The most serious breach of someone's autonomy involves coercion that contravenes that person's own rational, reflective judgment.
Practicing homosexuals believe that their lifestyle is best for them. If
they are told they must refrain from homosexual activity because such
activity is psychologically unhealthy, their own deep sense of how to
live is rejected.1 2 This justification for restriction is more of an insult
12

This Article does not discuss the complicated subject of coercion that successfully
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to their status as autonomous persons than any justification based on
harm to others.
Exactly how much paternalism people will countenance depends
on how strongly they rate the value of autonomy and to what degree
they trust the judgments of the government as to what is in their selfinterests. Perhaps no one has given as much careful study to these
problems as Joel Feinberg. Writing from a liberal perspective, Feinberg, like Mill, endorses an absolute principle that someone's own
physical, psychological, or economic good should not be a basis for
criminal prohibitions against voluntary behavior.'3 This position is
substantially more libertarian than the practices of modem societies
and what most people in them would endorse.
Some secondary questions regarding legal regulation involve the
availability of civil law consequences when criminal prohibitions
would be inappropriate, rules against third persons (such as pimps)
profiting from consensual acts between others, and taxation designed
to discourage behavior. Much could be said on each of these subjects,
but this Article will briefly comment only on the third.
Mill concluded that although raising money disproportionately
on unhealthy activities is acceptable (the government can tax liquor
sales at a higher rate than milk sales), it is unacceptable to set a tax to
discouragebehavior that, in principle, should be free from criminal restriction.' 4 Disregard the fact that cigarette smoking harms nonsmokers, and assume the following for the volume of sales under
various levels of cigarette taxes:
Tax Rate Per Pack
Sales in Millions
Revenue
0
20
0
$1.00
15
$15 million
$1.50
8
$12 million
The only reason to prefer tax (C) to tax (B) is to discourage
smoking; Mill's proposition bars this resolution. Mill's conclusion,
however, is not warranted on consequentialist grounds. People who
have a strong desire to smoke will continue to do so if tax (C) is in
place, and the "experiment in living" of smoking will not be
squelched. A payable tax does not foreclose choice in the manner of a
successful prohibition. 15 Thus, the consequentialist reasons against
outright prohibition apply with much less force to a discouraging tax
(A)
(B)
(C)

alters the subject's judgment about what is worthwhile.
13 FEINBERG,

supra note 3, at 1-49.

14 ML, supra note 6, at 123-24.

15 Of course, an enforced tax of $300 per pack will be a more severe restriction than an
unenforced prohibition.
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that is not too high. 16 Matters are more complex if one focuses on a
smoker's intrinsic right to autonomy. One might think autonomy is
breached if the state tries to manipulate behavior for the smoker's
own benefit. In this event, tax (C) is not distinguishable in principle
from a prohibition. On the other hand, the choice to smoke is still
available, and the price of cigarettes is no greater than if natural factors (disastrous storms) or economic factors drove the price of cigarettes up. In its effect on choice, the tax, therefore, still differs from a
successful prohibition. Thus, it is impossible to move from the conclusion that the law of crimes should leave self-harming behavior free,
to the conclusion that taxation to discourage the behavior would be
inapt.
V.

REQUIREMENTS TO REFRAIN

FROM AcTs THAT OFFEND OTHERS

Some acts that do not cause harm in a more concrete sense offend others who observe them or who know they take place. Often
people regard the offending behavior as immoral in some sense. Is
offense an appropriate basis for legal restraint or is this an aspect of
morality that the law should not enforce?
The analysis is fairly simple for activities that offend unwilling witnesses and that may be carried on in private (e.g., sexual intercourse).
In such a case, the act, itself, is not immoral; rather, the immorality is
the failure to respect the cultural sense of what may decently be done
in public, before involuntary witnesses (a "public" performance before
willing consumers is a different matter). Of course, the law should not
enforce the sensitivities of the most timid, and many things that social
conventions treat as offensive (e.g., belching loudly in a restaurant) do
not warrant legal regulation; but most people agree that criminal restrictions appropriately protect people against instances of public offensiveness. Of course, in certain instances, countervailing rights
qualify this conclusion. Suppose that religious symbols worn openly
by a minority or forms of speech (say, flag burning) by dissidents offend the majority. Rights of free exercise of religion and free speech
may preclude offense as a basis for legal restriction. In the United
States, courts treat such laws as unconstitutional infringements on
liberty.
Some acts offend individuals who are not witnesses to them. For
example, some people are disturbed to know that homosexual acts
occur. Mutilation of the bodies of those who have died and cannibalism are more perplexing examples. Isolating the issue of whether to
16 If a set amount of tax is unfair to poor smokers, lawmakers can calibrate the amount
of tax to a smoker's wealth.
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make offense a basis for legal restriction is not easy. It is possible to
imagine people being offended by private acts which they do not regard as immoral, but this would be unusual. Typically, people are offended by behavior that they find wrongful. Therefore, in practice,
asking whether the opinion that behavior is wrongful is ajustification
for prohibiting the behavior is not too different from asking whether
deep offense is ajustification. But belief in wrongfulness and feeling
of deep offense are, or can be, distinguishable bases for restricting
behavior, and this section focuses on the latter.
With regard to the element of offense, some absolute, or near
absolute, principles are plausible. These are presented here without
sustained defense. First, if those offended do not have any moral objection to the behavior, the law should permit it. The law should not restrict people's liberty to live their own lives as they choose because
others are disturbed by what they do. Second, offense at religious
practices that cause no secular harm cannot be a basis for restriction.
Third, offense at non-religious practices (such as homosexual acts or
eating pork) because the practices violate some people's religious beliefs should not be a basis for restriction in a country that values religious freedom and does not maintain a close connection between
some religion and the government. Perhapsin a country that is overwhelmingly Jewish or Moslem, prohibitions on pork eating would be
acceptable.
It does not violate these limits if the law restricts an act because
people have a non-religiously based belief in its wrongfulness that
causes the act to offend them deeply. If other appropriate bases for
restriction are present, deep offense may count in the balance; but it
is doubtful that it could ever be the primary basis for restricting liberty. This doubt, however, hinges on a particular view of mutilation of
bodies, desecration of graves, etc., which are frequently presented as
the strongest candidates for restrictions based on offense. When a
loved-one dies, the deepest emotions do not fully separate the body
from the person. Abuse of the body would feel like abuse of the person. More broadly, abuse of the bodies of strangers feels like abuse of
people. Emotionally, if not reasonably, mutilation is a harm to the
person who lived in the body; it is also a harm to those who identify
strongly with the person. In addition, it may cause people concern
over what will happen to their bodies after they die. It is misleading to
characterize as "offense" the deep sense that this behavior causes
harm. Protection of human remains is proper, but it should be understood as a special example of accepting (nonrational?) sentiments
of what constitutes harm to others.
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OTHERS BELIEVE ARE

IMMORAL

Is it possible to justify legally restricting an act considered immoral, if that consideration does not stem from any harm (to others
or self) and offense the act may cause? Sometimes this seems to be the
issue about legal enforcement of morality, but conceptual clarity is not
easy. Part of the difficulty is that claims that such enforcement of morality is improper dissolve into rather different kinds of arguments.
Another part of the difficulty stems from the doubt that any acts really
are regarded as immoral in and of themselves, apart from some perception of harm. On the latter point, beliefs about homosexual acts
provide a helpful illustration. Almost everyone who thinks homosexual acts are morally wrong also believes they are psychologically unhealthy for those who engage in them. But someone who believes
that the Bible reveals that God has condemned cities whose inhabitants practice sodomy might implicitly rate the evil of the acts as much
greater than the particular harm (in this life, at least) to practicing
individuals. One could conceivably think that certain individuals are
condemned to completely miserable lives no matter what they do, and
still object to their committing immoral acts. Such a complete divorce
of morality from harm may be unusual, but since moral perspectives
(especially religious ones) have different dimensions, the magnitude of
a moral wrong may seem greater than any harm it causes. Thus, it
does matter whether a sense of moral wrongness may underlie
restriction.
A claim that the law should enforce morality as such might assert
one of the following rationales: (1) objective immorality should be
punished; (2) a community properly punishes that which it regards as
immoral, without more; (3) a community may preserve its moral structures, without more; (4) people have a legitimate interest in preserving structures of life familiar to them; (5) individual liberty in selfregarding matters may weaken a community and dissolve bonds of
other-regarding morality, to the detriment of the people in that
community.
The last claim is plainly consequentialist. The notion is that people who perceive the law as accepting acts that they regard as abhorrent will, over time, lose respect for the rights and interests of others.
Although various passages may be interpreted differently, this seems
to be the drift of Patrick Devlin's argument that legal enforcement of
(private) morality is, in principle, appropriate. 17 It may be answered,
as H.L.A. Hart responded, that communities could observe other-re17 PATRICK DEVUN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
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garding morality, while respecting wide variations in private life, just
as communities now respect wide variations in religious belief and
practice. 18 Neither position is illogical. The real issue is a factual one,
and the answer could vary from community to community. Given normal fears of change and the actual capacity of social communities to
adapt to change (among religious beliefs, for example), people
should regard claims of social disintegration with great skepticism, but
one cannot rule them out in principle as conceivable justifications for
social restrictions.
Within societies that share views on religious truth, punishment
of objective immorality may seem perfectly appropriate. But such an
agreement alone is probably not a sufficientjustification for restriction
in a liberal democracy. The position advocated by certain liberal theorists that the state should remain neutral among conceptions of the
good life, leads to the belief that the state should not punish objective
immorality. Even if one thinks the state need not be neutral in this
regard, coercion of adults with respect to their behavior apart from its
damaging consequences may not seem appropriate. This tentative
conclusion is tested by examples like sex with animals and staged bear
fights. Human sex with animals, bestiality, is almost universally criminal, and the main reason is not animal protection. One may, perhaps,
find sufficient justification for restricting sex with animals in its unhealthiness for the human participants, and perhaps the morally
grounded offense felt by others. However, these justifications probably do not capture all the bases for prohibition; a sense of fundamental immorality independent of harm also contributes. Similarly, with
bear fighting, worries that it would make human observers more cruel
and aggressive may be only part of the story. These examples show
that even in liberal democracies, a sense of objective immorality affects feelings about legislation. Whether acting on these feelings is
consistent with liberal principles is debatable.
Those who are skeptical about the existence of objective morality
or about government's enforcement of such morality may still believe
that a community may enforce its own morality, independent of harm
and offense. But apart from negative consequences of nonenforcement, why should existing morality be frozen in amber, if members of
the community do not assume that the morality is objectively
required?19
H.LA HART, LAV, LIBERTY, AND MORArw (1963).
This Article does not address the complex intermediate possibility of observers who
do not think a particular morality is objectively required, but who are asking themselves if a
community is justified in enforcing moral norms that the community thinks are objectively
required.
18
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Claims about moral structures and structures of life seek to answer why the community may enforce its own morality. Both claims
come down to the idea that members of a community have some interest in preserving forms of life familiar to them. If the argument is
not to reduce either to a bald contention that a community can enforce its morality or to an assertion that offense justifies restraint, then
it must be based on the value of continuity and psychological security
in people's lives. This is a kind of consequentialist basis, although one
that would need to be strong if it is to override the liberty of people to
choose their own ways of life. As suggested with respect to offense,
sustaining a morality that is directly dependent on a religious perspective probably should not count as a justification in a liberal society.
The relationship between political philosophy and constitutional
requisites was at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick,20 a United States Supreme
Court case reviewing the constitutionality of a ban on sodomy as it
applied to homosexuals. A majority of five justices found that a public
view that homosexual acts were immoral was a constitutionally sufficient basis for a prohibition of such acts. The dissenters did not express disagreement with this conclusion in all applications, but argued
that the public's opinion about immorality was an inadequate basis for
constitutional restrictions when the fundamental interest of sexual intimacy was involved. Although judges are influenced by their senses
of sound political and moral philosophy, any judge might conclude
that a legislature is constitutionally permitted to base prohibitions on
grounds that would be eschewed under the best understanding of reasons for infringing upon individual liberty.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The law uncontroversially enforces much morality that concerns
preventing harm to people. Moral judgment is needed to determine
what count as relevant harms and to decide what are appropriate bases for legal regulation; but whether law should enforce some aspects
of morality is genuinely disputed. Although people sometimes assert
that legal rules should not require strangers to assist each other, no
simple principle yields that conclusion. Indirect, as well as direct,
harm can appropriately underlie regulation. Usually people should
remain free to decide what is good for themselves, but restraint for
the good of those who are regulated is sometimes defensible, particularly when choices are not rational and restraint is based on values
embraced by the subjects of regulation. Contrary to what Mill asserted, taxes to discourage behavior may be justified even if outright
20 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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prohibition is not. Public offense is a proper basis for restriction; private offense ordinarily is not, unless it is linked to a belief that action
is immoral. Various reasons may explain why societies should punish
acts that people regard as immoral, even when no identifiable individuals are harassed. The strongest of these arguments rest on undesirable consequences to the social fabric; even these are much easier to
assert than to support with persuasive factual hypotheses.
If this essay has a central point, it is the need to avoid reductionist
simplicities when addressing whether, and when, the law should enforce morality.

